of the Children's Rights Referendum suggests the need to pay more academic attention paid to the dangers posed by interest groups securing control of the political agenda.
Finally, campaigns for constitutional change that seek to entrench or refine constitutional values should engage directly and clearly with those values; otherwise, the potential for meaningful engagement with voters will be lost.
II Referendums and Constitutional Change
Referendums have a chequered history as instruments of legal change. Gallagher and Uleri note the 'standard criticism' that 'the general public is simply too ill-informed or irresponsible to be trusted to make decisions on complicated questions.' 9 For some, the deliberative and democratic credentials of referendums are irretrievably undermined by the mismatch between the purity of the democratic claim ('the people have spoken') and the possibility for elite control. Elites can control who votes (either through delineating the territory or the criteria for identifying voters), what is voted on (constructing the question), the flow of information (whether through funding rules, the proposal, and the Supreme Court finding against the government information campaign probably all contributed to this. F Sheahan, 'Children's Referendum passed by thin margin of 58pc to 42pc' The Irish Independent 3 (11 November 2012); H McGee 'Why the referendum was closer than predicted' Irish Times (13 November 2012).
limits on spending or restrictions on free speech), and the amount of time for deliberation. 10 The Summer 2015 referendum in Greece was widely perceived as problematic on account of the short campaign and the opacity, perhaps even pointlessness, of the question asked. 11 These concerns were substantiated by the fact that the Greek Government subsequently signed up to bailout terms that were far harsher even than those apparently rejected in the referendum. 12 Likewise, concerns have been raised over the use of referendums against the backdrop of physical force and secessionist claims.
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Even if these complaints turn on the misuse of referendums, referendums can still be problematic in functioning democracies that seek to avoid elite control. The problem of rational ignorance (given the low likelihood that any one vote will affect the outcome) may be even more acute for referendums that decide issues than for elections of representatives. 14 Others accept that these problems may arise, but argue for measures that reduce elite control and increase the possibilities for deliberative engagement. If a referendum process can genuinely be an exercise in deliberative democracy, the authenticity of the people's voice that emerges is a valuable element of a democracy, particularly on questions of constitutional foundation and constitutional change, not attainable in any other way. 15 The Scottish Independence Referendum is generally seen as a positive example of the referendum process. Richard Sinnott identifies a 'potentially powerful religious-conservative versus secularliberal cleavage that remains politically subliminal' underlying politics in Ireland. 21 This cleavage manifested itself in constitutional referendums on divorce (1986 and 1995) and abortion (1983, 1992 and 2002) and subsequently in the 2015 marriage referendum. As political parties and interest groups coalesce around cleavages, the support of these groups for a proposal can help voters to reach a decision that reflects their interests, broadly defined. 22 Lupia and Johnston argue, however, that voters can be competent without being fully informed, once they reach the same judgement as they would if fully informed. 23 The Children's Rights Referendum was presented in terms of the cleavage identified by Sinnott. 24 In the years leading up to the referendum proposal, the interest groups supporting the proposal were, broadly speaking, on the secular/liberal side of the political spectrum. More starkly, most of the voices raised against the proposal were from a religious and/or conservative background. Mary O'Rourke, a leading politician who chaired the Oireachtas Committee that formulated one of the reform proposals, characterised opponents of the children's rights referendum as 'an extreme right-wing element in Ireland which-even though the headlines scream of the shameful abuse of children-will regard any such intrusion as being against the Constitution and contrary to the fundamental rights of the family'. 25 According to this narrative for change, conservative forces wanted to maintain a constitutional preference for parental rights over children's rights. However, this depended on a misunderstanding of the constitutional position. The Constitution, as we shall shortly see, did not grant parents Although the pre-amendment Articles 41 and 42 of the Irish Constitution contain one or two references to parental rights, the better characterisation is that they accord a high level of authority to parents in respect of children's rights. The Family is protected 'in its constitution and authority.' Parents have a 'right and duty' to provide for the education of their children. There is one explicit child's right: the right to attend a school receiving public money without attending religious instruction. There is one explicit parents' right:
the rights of parents in the matter of religious and moral formation. However, the centrally important provision of Article 42.5 gave a residual power to the State to protect children, framed in terms of the child having rights and parents owing a duty to their children. This is fundamentally inconsistent with a parental rights model. The better reading of the Constitution is therefore that it recognised children's rights and provided that parents were to be the authoritative decision-makers for children, but with a residual power for the State to interfere in the case of parental failure. It could be argued that this gave too much authority to parents, but it did not protect parental rights in opposition to children's rights.
Consistent with this analysis, the courts interpreted Article 42.5 as mandating considerable deference to parents when making joint decisions about their children, unless they had failed in their duty. Decisions made by well-meaning parents to refuse medical treatment or procedures would not be overturned, unless serious consequences were immediately likely. 27 In custody cases, the courts had ordered the return of a child to her parents who married after an adoption process commenced but before it completed. In an early case, the Court ordered the return against what appeared to be in 26 There can, in principle, be an objective conception of the child's best interests. It is simply the case that no model of children's rights can secure a child's best interests in all circumstances, because both parents and the state are prone to mistakes. On the general difficulties with a best interests test, see J Herring and C Foster, 'Welfare means relationality, virtue and altruism ' (2012) between parents and state; it did, however, provide a catchy and capacious political slogan around which interest groups were able to coalesce, leading the campaign for constitutional change.
We do not use the term 'interest group' in a pejorative way. 42 The groups that lobbied for constitutional change in Ireland exhibit the three characteristics suggested by Beyers et al as defining interest groups: some level of organisation, to distinguish them from simple waves of popular opinion or broad social movements; political interests, or particular policy outcomes sought to be achieved; and informality, insofar as they usually do not run candidates for election or seek public office. 43 They included the Children's Rights Alliance, formed in 1995 to secure the rights of children in Ireland through the full implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child;
Barnardos, a children's charity that also engages in campaigning for children on issues such as housing, public health, education, and child protection; and the Irish Society for Most of the abuse catalogued in these reports was done with the complicity of the state, often as a result of parents being ignored. Where parents were at fault, there is no suggestion that the Constitution actually impeded the state from taking action to protect the children in question. Notwithstanding that the reform campaign had originated in a claim that the Constitution overly protected parents' rights, the 'children's rights' slogan was sufficiently capacious to include the contradictory claim that the Constitution gave too much power to state institutions at the expense of parents. This capaciousness also explains how such widely divergent proposals could be formulated under the rubric of 'children's rights', and equally welcomed by 'children's rights' interest-groups. The phrase 'children's rights' had become totemic for the secular-liberal side of the political cleavage. It was an effective totem because it was agnostic as to the core constitutional issue of parental authority and therefore could plausibly be attached to any reform proposal.
The Amendment that ultimately passed largely preserves the constitutional status quo.
It retains the preference for parental authority in respect of children's rights. Although replacing Article 42.5, it makes only marginal changes to the threshold at which the state can intervene in families. O'Shea argues, and we agree, that the post-amendment threshold could still 'serve as a significant barrier to State intervention.' 50 It seems to change little, and would not appear to alter the required outcome of the healthcare cases considered above. Article 42A.4 requires that legislation provide that the best interests of the child will be the paramount consideration in proceedings brought by the State to protect child welfare or involving the adoption, guardianship, custody of or access to a child. The legislation must also ensure that the views of the child will be ascertained and given appropriate weight. This use of the 'best interests' test is radically different from that in the 2010 proposal. Here 'best interests' is the criterion to be employed by the court only where it has already deemed that parents have failed in their duty requiring the court to take their place. Under the 2010 proposal, 'best interests' had provided both the threshold for intervention and the criterion to guide intervention. The Amendment allows married parents voluntarily to place their children for adoption.
It authorises the legislature to require the application of the best interests test and the giving of weight to the views of the child in adoption, guardianship and custody proceedings. This might allow for a different outcome in those rare but troubling cases, noted above, where unmarried parents marry before an adoption process is completed.
These are the only two changes of any significance effected by the Amendment.
O'Shea, a strong advocate of constitutional change to improve child protection, characterised the 2012 changes as 'likely to be minimal', and only a 'small step in the right direction'; the rights of the child 'would seemingly remain inferior and subordinate to the protection afforded to marital autonomy.' 51 More commonly, however, reform advocates sought to extract from the amendment proposal some constitutional provisions that could be said to amount to significant change. First, the interest group might only be able to achieve its end through constitutional change, since the constitutional order entrenches something antithetical to their goal.
However, the Children's Rights Amendment only made two such changes, in the field of adoption; these were not the focal point of the campaign for change, and do not explain the broader aspects of the proposal. Secondly, Posner and Landes argue that a 'constitutional provision confers more durable protection than is possible by ordinary legislative action' and would thus be more valuable to an interest group. 58 This has the advantage of forcing any interest group pursuing a contrary outcome to operate at the 54 Beyers et al (n 42) 1120. 55 Of the small amount of literature that exists, most of it is found in the Law and Economics movement.
The reasons for interest groups to seek constitutional change was briefly discussed by W Landes and R Posner in a landmark paper, 'The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective '(1975) In all likelihood, some combination of these factors was at play. After many years, a Government had finally published its wording and set a date for holding a referendum claiming to protect children's rights. Any qualms or uncertainties about the wording of a 61 Dixon argues that even nominal success in changing a constitution cannot guarantee that a desired shift in norms and values will take place. She cites the example of the 'race power' amendment to the Australian constitution in the 1960s, and hypothesises that an unclear set of priorities about what message to send, along with an equivocal government campaign, contributed significantly to that failure. R Dixon, 'Amending Constituting Identity ' (2012) If a final proposal would make some modest improvement in the constitutional position of children, or was not actively deleterious to that position, then supporting it would make sense regardless of the precise content.
V The Referendum Campaign
Whatever the explanation, the attitude of the interest groups made it considerably more difficult for the referendum campaign to function in support of a genuine exercise of deliberative democracy. An amendment that largely reproduced the constitutional status quo was being presented, through the rubric of children's rights, as addressing a significant constitutional and societal malaise. This made it almost impossible for people to discern precisely what they were being asked to vote on. 65 Tierney, although generally sympathetic to referendums, queries whether a referendum is suitable to determine an issue that is so complicated that a reasonably well informed voter is unlikely to understand it. 66 The Children's Rights Referendum provides an example of this. First, there was a disproportion between the length of the amendment proposal and the significance of the changes. Any explanation faced the difficult task of elaborating why so much text achieved so little. Secondly, the calls for reform that 65 A survey after the referendum established that 41% of people felt that they did not understand the referendum either at all or particularly well. Referendum Commission's Report on the Referendum on the 31st Amendment of the Constitution (Children) Bill 2012, available at <http://www.refcom.ie/en/PastReferendums/The-Children-Referendum/Report/Report-on-the-Referendum-on-the-31st-Amendmentof-the-Constitution-Children-Bill-2012.pdf> accessed 27 July 2016. This level of declared misunderstanding is not unusual for recent referendums.
animated the children's rights movement were based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Constitution as a charter for parents' rights. This meant that there was no coherent account of how the Constitution should be amended, against which the Government's actual proposal could be measured for effectiveness. Thirdly, these two problems combined in an unusual way. Both sides could claim to protect children's rights, and the proposal made little or no change to what most people would have thought it was intended to address: the state's power to intervene to protect children.
As noted above, voters can be competent without being fully informed, once they reach the same judgement as they would if fully informed. In this regard, cues from political parties and interest groups are essential. 67 Christin, Hug and Sciarini note theoretical models that suggest endorsements by political parties and interest groups can give important information about the issues at stake in a referendum. This is particularly the case since parties and interest groups seldom have any incentive to misinform voters about their own preferences. 68 The Children's Rights Referendum campaign did not reliably provide these cues to voters, however. All political parties lined up in favour of the proposal, which was strongly endorsed by the interest groups that had sought the Referendum. 69 This likely led many voters to believe incorrectly that the proposal took significant steps to improve the ways in which children were treated by the Constitution.
Several opponents of previous children's rights proposals also cautiously welcomed the proposal, apparently satisfied that the proposal did not undermine parental authority within families. 70 The people were therefore presented with most existing protagonists to the debate either supporting or not opposing the proposal. This elite consensus was the likely cause of three features of the subsequent campaign. First, proponents of the referendum suggested that the broad support from political parties and advocacy groups could lead to difficulties in starting a proper debate on the issues. 71 Secondly, it led the press coverage to suggest that the government would 'secure a comfortable majority' for the proposal because of this support. 72 This may have engendered apathy, the public disengaging from an issue that seemed settled in advance. Thirdly, the elite consensus meant that the people were not being asked to check governmental power but instead to legitimise a conclusion already settled on by the elites in political parties, possibly causing further disengagement from the issues. 73 Though opposition to the amendment did emerge, the small number of prominent No campaigners, the diversity of their views on the issue, and lack of central organisation made fruitful debate between the Yes and No campaigns difficult. As one source put it to the Irish Times, the problem was that the No campaign was 'so small and so much on the margins of society'.
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All of these features reduced the capacity of the campaign to be a valuable exercise of deliberative democracy. Overall, the arguments advanced for and against the proposal bore little relationship to the actual proposal. The Yes campaign dealt largely in generalities, emphasising the proper place of children in a caring society and the opportunity to right the wrongs of the past. The No Campaign responded with claims that the proposal would undermine the rights of parents. In turn, the Yes Campaign sought to counter these claims, maintaining that the proposal would not undermine parents. This in turn raised the question of whether the referendum would achieve anything.
At the broadest level of generality, the Yes campaign focused on the assertion that the amendment would protect children in a manner more profound than the Constitution did previously. This was put in several different ways. The framing of the proposal as the 'children's rights referendum' implied that constitutional rights of children needed alteration or improvement. Campaigners for the proposal suggested that it would right the wrongs of the past, 75 or offer a better level of protection for children generally. 76 On other occasions, it was framed as a referendum on whether children should be both seen and heard. 77 In context, this argument seemed to be more about children being valued in society rather than a specific reference to the voice of the child in judicial proceedings.
These sweeping, platitudinous statements were often accompanied in campaign literature and posters with images of smiling children or, in one case, the image of a somewhat scared-looking child clutching a teddy bear. 78 The umbrella group campaigning on behalf of various children's organisations was called 'Yes for Children'.
The implicit suggestion was that those in favour of children and child-protection should simply vote Yes. The dominant meme of the Campaign was the incoherent position that 'children's rights' was the way to secure a child's best interests, simultaneously protecting children from their parents and from the state. This amounted to little more than sloganeering. Tierney notes the danger that 'unscrupulous elites can hijack the referendum with simplistic campaign slogans, appealing to populist sentiments which ignore the complexity of the issues involved.' 79 In this referendum, however, the emptiness of the slogan was mirrored by the emptiness of the referendum proposal itself.
The chief allegation of many on the No side was that the amendment was in fact about the state taking children away from parents, resulting in more frequent state intervention in the family after less serious parental failures. also argued that the best interests of the child would lead to the overriding of the wishes and interests of the parents in most or all cases where the state disagreed with them. 82 These arguments relied on precisely the same misconception of children's rights as held by the Yes campaign; they merely differed in normative direction. They exaggerated the scope of the changes proposed, and were sometimes put across in an alarmist fashion. 83 In response, Yes campaigners relied frequently on the fact that Article 41 was not being altered, and thus the rights of parents would remain unaffected. 84 As one commentator put it, since Article 41 remained intact, the amendment would 'not diminish parent's rights; it will enhance children's rights.'
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Lacking any clear understanding of the constitutional position, this debate between the two sides simply could not be resolved. Instead, it was a case of unverifiable claim and counter-claim, almost calculated to reduce public understanding.
The reassurance about parental authority provided by the Yes campaign invited the charge that the referendum would achieve little. A fourth version stressed the more specific changes that would be made by the proposal, such as the provision for the voluntary adoption of marital children, and provision for the voice of the child to be heard in judicial proceedings. 95 The adoption changes had some significance but did not speak to the necessity and usefulness of the broader aspects of the amendment, and hearing the voice of the child could have been achieved by legislative change. Fifthly, emphasis was sometimes placed on change in the threshold for State intervention. Some argued that earlier and more effective intervention would be possible. 96 Others stressed that it would allow for the child's best interests to be put first. 97 However, these arguments rarely offered detailed suggestions of how these changes would play out in practice and, based on our analysis of the referendum proposal above, were not supported by the actual text. 101 Dixon is more sanguine than some about the possibility of changing judge made law through formal amendment; Dixon (n 61). Ackerman similarly believes that any desired change in constitutional law can be brought about using formal amendment rules. B Ackerman, 'Transformative Appointments' (1987) (1988) 101 Harv L Rev 1164, 1180. We do not argue that textual amendments are irrelevant or entirely without use in changing judicial interpretations. We only contend that this is often difficult to achieve, difficulties are accentuated where the constitutional legislator is the people. Although formalised consultation processes can enhance the ability of the general population to grapple with constitutional problems (and the Irish Referendum Commission makes a significant contribution in this regard), there are limits to the ability of people to reach considered conclusions where the very meaning of judicial doctrines is itself hotly contested. This is particularly so where the incentive of political actors is not to educate the public on constitutional law, but rather to win the referendum campaign. If the need for and effect of changes cannot be explained to the people in a straightforward way, it is questionable whether constitutional change is worth seeking given the uncertainty about its ultimate efficacy. A lesson we might draw from this is that, sometimes at least, we should be prepared to live with constitutional laws that we regard as suboptimal rather than engaging in long and protracted campaigns for changes that ultimately achieve little. To be clear, we are not suggesting that it is improper or illegitimate for legislatures or the people to seek to overturn or nuance judicial interpretations of the Constitution. It is rather that when the desired changes require alteration of minute points of judge-made constitutional doctrine, this may be very difficult in practice, and thus may-on balance-not be worth pursuing.
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The problems of public understanding were considerably exacerbated by the misunderstanding of the Constitution's position on children's rights that took hold in Irish civic society. By the time of the referendum, it was too firmly embedded to be overcome. The proper place for legal academics in the constitutional reform process is open for debate, but this particular referendum-dealing as it did with a complex area of constitutional law, which required broad understanding of the constitutional framework and constitutional case law to grasp-surely needed expert input. Despite efforts made by many constitutional lawyers-including the authors of this article-to weigh in on aspects of this issue in the media, this failed to clarify issues in the public mind. Rather, it likely fed a narrative of claim and counter-claim about the effects of the and there may be no way to ensure one's textual changes will achieve the desired result. This is not an argument in favour of informal change, however, which may suffer from similar difficulties.
102 Different considerations pertain where the change is to the detail of clearly posited rules in the constitutional text, such as the referendum in Ireland in 2011 to allow reductions in judicial salaries. In those circumstances, the challenge of public explanation is far smaller.
referendum, further clouding public understanding. A second lesson is for legal academics to be careful in their analysis of areas of constitutional law where change is being debated or considered, while being resolute and timely in correcting misunderstandings, and not overestimating their ability to make a helpful contribution to public debate during the campaign proper.
The political cleavage was a crucial component in determining the attitude of interest groups to the referendum proposal. They were too quick to support a proposal that, even adopting the flawed antithesis between parents' and children's rights, made very little change. A fundamentally misleading signal was thus sent to voters about what the proposal would achieve. In reality, the fact that the proposal was a compromise between competing interest groups-trying to satisfy children's rights campaigners while not alienating conservative interests-meant that it was difficult to sell convincingly to the public. In trying to please both sides, the government's proposal ended up confusing people as to what, if anything, was actually being achieved. A third lesson we might draw from this experience is that more attention needs to be paid to the role of interest groups in advocating and promoting constitutional change, and the motivations for those groups seeking change on a constitutional level.
It may be that the true purpose of many of those who supported the Children's Rights Amendment was to effect a symbolic change in the way that children are viewed and valued. There can be no objection to constitutional amendments advancing symbolic aims or seeking to enshrine values in a constitution; constitutions are important sites of national symbolism. However, for symbolic change to happen, it must be understood, and meaningfully deliberated upon. Political actors must be prepared to engage in real debates about values. Instead of framing the amendment as being about symbolism, identity, and values, campaigners for the children's rights referendum focused on the minutiae of alleged practical changes that were often elusive. Even when symbolism was discussed, it was dwarfed by the focus on micro-management of legal outcomes promised by the referendum. Instead of embracing the fact that issues underlying the referendum were part of a significant and hotly contested debate about values, the value reductionism that was seen in the referendum campaign-that we should vote Yes should mean, will be lost.
